This is Part #3 in this series. If you haven’t read Part #1 and Part #2, you probably should.

< Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1) >

< Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2) >

As you well know by now I am a big believer is After Action Reviews/Reports (AARs), and a critical part of that process is coming up with a list of “Lessons Learned” (LLs). Learning from mistakes helps avoid making those same mistakes again and again.

I was not in Israel at the time of 10/7 attacks. I do not have access to any classified information on what happened before, during, or after the attacks. I have watched hours and hours of reports, interviews, first-hand accounts, military videos, first responder videos, and read many first-hand articles/accounts of that day by survivors and responders. While I am not representing these LLs to be all-inclusive or without flaw, I feel confident that these observations and conclusions are well-grounded and applicable to learn from.

Further, these posts are not intended to denigrate Israel, the IDF, Israeli citizens, victims of 10/7 or in anyway take from the horrific attack on their country and citizens by Islamic terrorists, Hamas. There are many heroic stories of acts of bravery by countless men and women in Israel that day. My goal is to provide information and my opinions on how to prevent such things from happening to you and to your family.

There will be multiple posts in this series to help cover what I feel at important and applicable topics.

#8 – Communications

Remember there are two parts to communications; 1) hardware, 2) software. And no, for software I am not referring to the software found in electronic devices like computers. The software I am referring to is how/when people communicate, the ‘people’ aspect of communications. The hardware part is easy…the actual devices used to communicate, and the equipment to support those devices.

In the early stages of attack Islamic terrorists did some damage to cell and radio towers. Fortunately that damage was not sufficient enough to eliminate all communications. It did however disturb communications to some degree. It is impossible for me to make an informed statement as to the degree that the physical damage actually hampered the ability of police and military forces to respond to the attack.

When it came to the ‘software’ or people side of communications the problems become more evident:

• • Civilians – While it appears that cell-phone coverage was more than adequate and any damage to cell towers, etc. was not severe enough to substantially reduce the ability of civilians to communicate. However, it became clear to me that people were not knowledgeable enough, or properly trained, to use communications effectively. It appears that people passed inadequate and inaccurate information between each other. While attacks were taking place within a community, there are many reports of civilians calling/texting distant relatives or friends vs communicating threat information to others within their own communities. Additionally, it appears that civilian members of community security response teams did not have sufficient, adequate, or standardized methods of communicating among themselves.
  • Police – There was an initial, clearly apparent, problem with police communications. The initial targeting and severity of the terrorist attacks against police officers and their infrastructure seriously disrupted the ability to relay sufficient/adequate information to up-line authorities. My impression is that there were no dedicated communications personnel…all officers were directly involved in tactical defense. There is some evidence that attaching terrorists did target radio antennas, power plants, and other police communications equipment…but it is unclear if that added to the communications problems.
  • Military – IDF itself has reported that their communications that day failed miserably. It primarily centered around not being able to acquire adequate information on the situation in the area involved in the attacks by higher authorities. Further complicating this process breakdown was the fact the military headquarters in the affected area was under heavy attack itself. During these types of intense battles it is often hard, sometimes impossible, for on-the-ground personnel to provide accurate situational information (SitReps). This is usually a result of intense threat of being over-run, lack of training, or lack-of experience…especially for high-stress situations. There also appears to be another factor involved…leadership. There is a saying in the emergency response leadership community; “It is better to have resources and not need them, than to need resources and not have them.” Had the centralized higher military leadership reacted by providing military response resources immediately upon learning of the chaotic situation, the IDF would have been on-scene within an hour or less vs 8 – 10 hours later. It goes back to SA…gain just enough information to make a good decision. Example: Reports of inbound rockets and gunfire comes in, although solid situational information is not available…roll rapid response forces immediately. They can always be turned around later if they are not needed.

#9 – Self-Sufficient Security

This particular point to me is a sore one to be sure. Many communities were protected only by a small police presence and little to no IDF military presence…even though these same communities were located directly adjacent to extremely violent terrorist strongholds who were well-armed and had attacked these communities previously. This is absolutely staggering to me in the scope of the bigger picture. Additionally, you had a music festival taking place with thousands of people present with no organized and well-armed security force…and no police presence that has been reported.

Granted, many of the communities did have civilian security teams who were organized to provide defense of that community. However, the reports indicate that half of these team members became casualties trying to reach the community armory where their weapons, ammunition, and body armor were stored. And the same reports indicate that approximately half of those that did reach the armories became casualties soon thereafter. Meaning…only 25% of the security team members were able to engage the attacking terrorists in defense of their communities. Further adding to the dire situation, almost all of the effective 25% had their homes destroyed and families murdered, burned alive, or kidnapped and taken to Gaza or killed en-route. The reason for the armories…Israel’s extremist gun restrictions and controls.

So here are some issues that I see on the part of the government:

• • The festival organizers completely failed to provide even a minimal security presence to protect the event participants.
  • Police leadership failed completely in anticipating the need for police officer presence at the festival either to enforce laws or provide protection.
  • The police leadership completely failed in properly staffing, training, and responding to the potential of terror attacks of this nature and/or magnitude.
  • The military leadership completely failed in properly staffing, training, and responding to the potential of terror attacks of this nature and/or magnitude.
  • Government organized community security teams were not properly provided with weapons, ammunition, and body armor that were readily available for them to do their job.

As I see it…since all government sponsored/organized security failed…it fell back on the citizenry to protect themselves. And they, the normal citizens, were wholly prevented from doing so due to the government’s extremist stance against guns. Ironically, the Jews during WWII in German, Poland, etc. were unable to protect themselves as well against the Nazis. Why? Those countries had extreme gun control laws preventing the average citizen from protecting themselves. And as such…millions of Jews were slaughtered.

When terror strikes…how far away is government protection? Even in the best of circumstances that protection is minutes away. But the terrorist attacked damage can be over withing within seconds. The best that can be hoped for is the police engage the terrorists upon arrival, but after the initial attack…sadly though, your family is probably already dead. Worst case…protection forces show up 8 – 10 hours later…long after your community is burned to the ground and its citizenry decimated.

The best community defense/protection comes from those citizens themselves…well armed, well trained, well organized, and ready/willing to protect their families, their homes, and their neighbors. Self-sufficient security is the answer…not dependence on government protection. A side or secondary benefit to self-sufficient security…much lower, or eliminated, criminal activity.

Series Articles –

• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #3)

Related Articles –

• Layering & the Common 7: Part #4 – Communications
• 7 Days of September – Day #3: Communications
• Tell me again why I need a radio…
• ComSec – What is it and how do I use it?
• Phonetic Alphabet
• Situational Awareness: Part 3 – Barriers to SA
• Situational Awareness: Part 4 – Team SA
• Monday Morning Personal Message…
• “Rise up !” Actions & Suggestions
• Couple things on my mind this morning…(8/26/2022)
• Time for a Step in an Action Plan!!
• The Art of War by Sun Tzu

 2009 - 2023 Copyright © AHTrimble.com ~ All rights reserved
No reproduction or other use of this content 
without expressed written permission from AHTrimble.com
See Content Use Policy for more information.