This is Part #3 in this series. If you haven’t read Part #1 and Part #2, you probably should.

< Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1) >

< Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2) >

As you well know by now I am a big believer is After Action Reviews/Reports (AARs), and a critical part of that process is coming up with a list of “Lessons Learned” (LLs). Learning from mistakes helps avoid making those same mistakes again and again.

I was not in Israel at the time of 10/7 attacks. I do not have access to any classified information on what happened before, during, or after the attacks. I have watched hours and hours of reports, interviews, first-hand accounts, military videos, first responder videos, and read many first-hand articles/accounts of that day by survivors and responders. While I am not representing these LLs to be all-inclusive or without flaw, I feel confident that these observations and conclusions are well-grounded and applicable to learn from.

Further, these posts are not intended to denigrate Israel, the IDF, Israeli citizens, victims of 10/7 or in anyway take from the horrific attack on their country and citizens by Islamic terrorists, Hamas. There are many heroic stories of acts of bravery by countless men and women in Israel that day. My goal is to provide information and my opinions on how to prevent such things from happening to you and to your family.

There will be multiple posts in this series to help cover what I feel at important and applicable topics.

#8 – Communications

Remember there are two parts to communications; 1) hardware, 2) software. And no, for software I am not referring to the software found in electronic devices like computers. The software I am referring to is how/when people communicate, the ‘people’ aspect of communications. The hardware part is easy…the actual devices used to communicate, and the equipment to support those devices.

In the early stages of attack Islamic terrorists did some damage to cell and radio towers. Fortunately that damage was not sufficient enough to eliminate all communications. It did however disturb communications to some degree. It is impossible for me to make an informed statement as to the degree that the physical damage actually hampered the ability of police and military forces to respond to the attack.

When it came to the ‘software’ or people side of communications the problems become more evident:

• • Civilians – While it appears that cell-phone coverage was more than adequate and any damage to cell towers, etc. was not severe enough to substantially reduce the ability of civilians to communicate. However, it became clear to me that people were not knowledgeable enough, or properly trained, to use communications effectively. It appears that people passed inadequate and inaccurate information between each other. While attacks were taking place within a community, there are many reports of civilians calling/texting distant relatives or friends vs communicating threat information to others within their own communities. Additionally, it appears that civilian members of community security response teams did not have sufficient, adequate, or standardized methods of communicating among themselves.
  • Police – There was an initial, clearly apparent, problem with police communications. The initial targeting and severity of the terrorist attacks against police officers and their infrastructure seriously disrupted the ability to relay sufficient/adequate information to up-line authorities. My impression is that there were no dedicated communications personnel…all officers were directly involved in tactical defense. There is some evidence that attaching terrorists did target radio antennas, power plants, and other police communications equipment…but it is unclear if that added to the communications problems.
  • Military – IDF itself has reported that their communications that day failed miserably. It primarily centered around not being able to acquire adequate information on the situation in the area involved in the attacks by higher authorities. Further complicating this process breakdown was the fact the military headquarters in the affected area was under heavy attack itself. During these types of intense battles it is often hard, sometimes impossible, for on-the-ground personnel to provide accurate situational information (SitReps). This is usually a result of intense threat of being over-run, lack of training, or lack-of experience…especially for high-stress situations. There also appears to be another factor involved…leadership. There is a saying in the emergency response leadership community; “It is better to have resources and not need them, than to need resources and not have them.” Had the centralized higher military leadership reacted by providing military response resources immediately upon learning of the chaotic situation, the IDF would have been on-scene within an hour or less vs 8 – 10 hours later. It goes back to SA…gain just enough information to make a good decision. Example: Reports of inbound rockets and gunfire comes in, although solid situational information is not available…roll rapid response forces immediately. They can always be turned around later if they are not needed.

#9 – Self-Sufficient Security

This particular point to me is a sore one to be sure. Many communities were protected only by a small police presence and little to no IDF military presence…even though these same communities were located directly adjacent to extremely violent terrorist strongholds who were well-armed and had attacked these communities previously. This is absolutely staggering to me in the scope of the bigger picture. Additionally, you had a music festival taking place with thousands of people present with no organized and well-armed security force…and no police presence that has been reported.

Granted, many of the communities did have civilian security teams who were organized to provide defense of that community. However, the reports indicate that half of these team members became casualties trying to reach the community armory where their weapons, ammunition, and body armor were stored. And the same reports indicate that approximately half of those that did reach the armories became casualties soon thereafter. Meaning…only 25% of the security team members were able to engage the attacking terrorists in defense of their communities. Further adding to the dire situation, almost all of the effective 25% had their homes destroyed and families murdered, burned alive, or kidnapped and taken to Gaza or killed en-route. The reason for the armories…Israel’s extremist gun restrictions and controls.

So here are some issues that I see on the part of the government:

• • The festival organizers completely failed to provide even a minimal security presence to protect the event participants.
  • Police leadership failed completely in anticipating the need for police officer presence at the festival either to enforce laws or provide protection.
  • The police leadership completely failed in properly staffing, training, and responding to the potential of terror attacks of this nature and/or magnitude.
  • The military leadership completely failed in properly staffing, training, and responding to the potential of terror attacks of this nature and/or magnitude.
  • Government organized community security teams were not properly provided with weapons, ammunition, and body armor that were readily available for them to do their job.

As I see it…since all government sponsored/organized security failed…it fell back on the citizenry to protect themselves. And they, the normal citizens, were wholly prevented from doing so due to the government’s extremist stance against guns. Ironically, the Jews during WWII in German, Poland, etc. were unable to protect themselves as well against the Nazis. Why? Those countries had extreme gun control laws preventing the average citizen from protecting themselves. And as such…millions of Jews were slaughtered.

When terror strikes…how far away is government protection? Even in the best of circumstances that protection is minutes away. But the terrorist attacked damage can be over withing within seconds. The best that can be hoped for is the police engage the terrorists upon arrival, but after the initial attack…sadly though, your family is probably already dead. Worst case…protection forces show up 8 – 10 hours later…long after your community is burned to the ground and its citizenry decimated.

The best community defense/protection comes from those citizens themselves…well armed, well trained, well organized, and ready/willing to protect their families, their homes, and their neighbors. Self-sufficient security is the answer…not dependence on government protection. A side or secondary benefit to self-sufficient security…much lower, or eliminated, criminal activity.

Series Articles –

• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #3)

Related Articles –

• Layering & the Common 7: Part #4 – Communications
• 7 Days of September – Day #3: Communications
• Tell me again why I need a radio…
• ComSec – What is it and how do I use it?
• Phonetic Alphabet
• Situational Awareness: Part 3 – Barriers to SA
• Situational Awareness: Part 4 – Team SA
• Monday Morning Personal Message…
• “Rise up !” Actions & Suggestions
• Couple things on my mind this morning…(8/26/2022)
• Time for a Step in an Action Plan!!
• The Art of War by Sun Tzu

 2009 - 2023 Copyright © AHTrimble.com ~ All rights reserved
No reproduction or other use of this content 
without expressed written permission from AHTrimble.com
See Content Use Policy for more information.

This is Part #2 in this series. If you haven’t read Part #1, you probably should.

< Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1) >

As you well know by now I am a big believer is After Action Reviews/Reports (AARs), and a critical part of that process is coming up with a list of “Lessons Learned” (LLs). Learning from mistakes helps avoid making those same mistakes again and again.

I was not in Israel at the time of 10/7 attacks. I do not have access to any classified information on what happened before, during, or after the attacks. I have watched hours and hours of reports, interviews, first-hand accounts, military videos, first responder videos, and read many first-hand articles/accounts of that day by survivors and responders. While I am not representing these LLs to be all-inclusive or without flaw, I feel confident that these observations and conclusions are well-grounded and applicable to learn from.

Further, these posts are not intended to denigrate Israel, the IDF, Israeli citizens, victims of 10/7 or in anyway take from the horrific attack on their country and citizens by Islamic terrorists, Hamas. There are many heroic stories of acts of bravery by countless men and women in Israel that day. My goal is to provide information and my opinions on how to prevent such things from happening to you and to your family.

There will be multiple posts in this series to help cover what I feel at important and applicable topics.

#5 – Normalcy Bias

Normalcy Bias is the refusal of your brain to accept that something has happened, will happen, or to what extent something has happened.

Report after report from 10/7 survivors made several points; 1) they thought it was just another rocket attack or a warning of a possible rocket attack, 2) even after people heard gunshots they didn’t connect it to a terrorist attack, 3) at the music festival, site of hundreds of young people slaughtered, even once they realized they were being attacked by terrorists, many didn’t react (try to escape) for 10 – 15 minutes. There are even videos of Israelis in cars driving past Hamas terrorists killing other Israelis and then dragging them out of their cars…and then the passer-byes getting killed themselves.

Ironically, these festival folks lived within hearing, a short walk, or in close proximity to Gaza…a heaven for Islamic terrorists (Hamas) who have repeatedly and publicly stated they want to kill all Jews and wipe Israel off the map. Israel is a country who has been regularly attacked by Muslims trying to eliminate the entire Hebrew religion and country of Israel. Israel is considered to be one of the toughest countries in the world in terms of being able to defend itself and its military prowess. Yet, almost all civilians and most police suffered from Normalcy Bias that day.

I have no explanation for this phenomena. I would have thought that Israelis, of all people, would be attuned to the signs of a terror attack and the correct steps to take to defeat the terrorists or at least protect themselves and their families.

The only thing I can suggest is to allow strange and out of the ordinary situations to startle you into action regardless of how foreign the event seems. I am asking for you to allow your mind to accept things as they truly are and not how you see them through all your psycho-social filters. A good example of what you can do to help prevent Normalcy Bias is “War Game It” with a buddy or two, or your wife, and say “What if this actually did happen, regardless if we think it will happen, what would we do?”

If you fail to recognize reality for what it is, reality will give you a wake-up call…and that could be a fatal mistake.

# 6 – Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive Dissonance occurs when we are presented with two or more sensory inputs that are contradictory to our expectations we can become very uncomfortable, very unbalanced mentally. Then we will consciously or unconsciously shun anything that is causing the unbalance. Meaning anything that is out of the ordinary will be blocked out mentally or simply ignored.

Cognitive Dissonance is similar to Normalcy Bias…but Cognitive Dissonance is the actual mental process that is taking place when presented with extreme out of the ordinary sensory inputs. Example: We hear rocket attack warning sirens, which we are used to, but ignore the sounds of gunfire. Example: We see people wearing masks with automatic weapons killing people in cars, but drive by them anyways because our brain can’t accept that unbalance of seeing terrorists killing our neighbors on the streets of our community.

The only explanation I have for this phenomena is lack of training. The citizens who lived in close proximity to some of the most violent Islamic terrorists in the world simply didn’t train for the possibility that they could be attacked…even though they lived within sight of those terrorist strongholds.

This could only be looked at as a complete breakdown of government emergency preparedness. Well, that and citizens not taking responsibility for their own emergency preparedness and safety. And this shows in two major ways; 1) extreme gun control by government, 2) lack of people applying for gun licenses.

# 7 – Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness (SA) is accurately observing and understanding the things taking place around you, then using that information to make good decisions and then take appropriate action.

Touchy subject alert – Somehow all of the Israeli intelligence services, the entire military, and all police resources missed that Hamas we preparing an extremely violent terrorist attack on 10/7…even though Hamas had been planning and preparing it for over a year. So thousands of those folks all suffered from poor, or non-existent, SA. But that was only the beginning.

If you look at the barriers to SA you see almost a textbook case study of just how bad it can get. Here are just some of them:

Physical Barriers:

• • • Communication – Hardware
    • Communication – Quality & Quantity
    • Staffing (under staffed, level of training)

Emotional/Mental Barriers:

• • • Normalcy Bias (includes Complacency, Perceptions)
    • Competency Bias
    • Overwhelmed (including: stress, distraction, conflict & Paralysis by Analysis)
    • Culture
    • Tunnel Vision

Looking at the situation objectively:

1. 1. 1. Communications broke-down fairly quickly due to radio/cell towers being disabled by attackers and poor, lack of adequate information being passed to next-level authorities by forces on the ground.
      2. Police staffing was extremely inadequate, and virtually no IDF presence even though the area was located in very close proximity to known terrorist strongholds.
      3. Normalcy and Competency Bias was rampant with civilians, police personnel, and military forces.
      4. Due to the sheer size, scope, and ferocity of the attacks civilians, police personnel, and military forces were overwhelmed. It took 8 – 12 hours for a solid IDF response to the attacks, and even days to clear all of the areas.

Basically…objectively speaking, SA was essentially non-existent that day. And that fact killed hundreds in an of itself.

Series Articles –

• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #3)

Related Articles –

• TRAP – The #1 obstacle to people getting prepared for emergencies and disasters is Normalcy Bias.
• TRAP – Normalcy Bias can kill you quicker than Competency Bias.
• TRAP – The #1 obstacle to people getting prepared for emergencies and disasters is Normalcy Bias.
• Immediate Action Warning!
• Then they came for… (part #2 of 3)
• Initiative ’17 – Part #5: Flipping the Switch
• Situational Awareness: Introduction
• Situational Awareness: Part 3 – Barriers to SA

 2009 - 2023 Copyright © AHTrimble.com ~ All rights reserved
No reproduction or other use of this content 
without expressed written permission from AHTrimble.com
See Content Use Policy for more information.

As you well know by now I am a big believer is After Action Reviews/Reports (AARs), and a critical part of that process is coming up with a list of “Lessons Learned” (LLs). Learning from mistakes helps avoid making those same mistakes again and again.

I was not in Israel at the time of 10/7 attacks. I do not have access to any classified information on what happened before, during, or after the attacks. I have watched hours and hours of reports, interviews, first-hand accounts, military videos, first responder videos, and read many first-hand articles/accounts of that day by survivors and responders. While I am not representing these LLs to be all-inclusive or without flaw, I feel confident that these observations and conclusions are well-grounded and applicable to learn from.

Further, these posts are not intended to denigrate Israel, the IDF, Israeli citizens, victims of 10/7 or in anyway take from the horrific attack on their country and citizens by Islamic terrorists, Hamas. There are many heroic stories of acts of bravery by countless men and women in Israel that day. My goal is to provide information and my opinions on how to prevent such things from happening to you and to your family.

There will be multiple posts in this series to help cover what I feel at important and applicable topics.

#1 – Can’t Depend on Government Protection

Repeatedly the same issue came up…the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was not able to respond quickly enough to protect citizens in the Gaza border settlements. In addition, the local police were not present in sufficient numbers, or with adequate arms, to provide security for those same citizens. A quote from an Israeli source, “the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were caught flat-footed.”

In most cases settlements/neighborhoods were attacked by relatively limited numbers of terrorists. However, these terrorists were well armed, fairly well trained, organized, and with a clear mission. They outgunned police in almost every situation, often using RPGs to initiate the attacks to overwhelm initial defenses. IDF troops were too distant to rapidly respond to provide defense, taking as long as 8 – 10 hours to arrive on scene. This allowed terrorists virtual free-reign to carry out their attacks.

According to IDF reports, further complicating the issue was “the IDF’s division headquarters under attack, it was almost impossible for the chief of staff in Tel Aviv to find out what was going on or how to respond in those crucial early hours of the assault.”

Israeli citizens were not able to depend on police personnel or military troops to provide adequate defense.

#2 – Gun Control Doesn’t Work

At the time of the attack Israel had, and still does have, extreme gun control laws. Only licensed gun owners may lawfully acquire, possess, or transfer a firearm…or ammunition. And then they are required to establish a genuine reason to possess a firearm or ammunition. The minimum age for gun ownership in Israel is 27 years, 21 years if completed national service or 18 years if served in the military; and gun owners must re-apply and re-qualify for their firearm license every three years. Licensed firearm owners in Israel are permitted to possess only one firearm and a limited quantity of ammunition.

These extreme gun restrictions made it relatively easy for terrorists to attack unarmed citizens who were unable to fight back and effectively defend themselves or their children. Those who might have possessed a pistol found they ran out of ammunition very quickly. There were entire neighborhoods and communities where no one had a gun to fight back against the terrorists.

Israeli citizens were not able to provide any reasonable self-defense against terrorists due to extremist gun controls, effectively disarming the population who lived in close proximity to known violent terrorists.

#3 – Safe Rooms have to be Safe

From Israelis themselves, “In the South of Israel, near the Gaza border, it’s a much different reality. These safe rooms did little to secure children watching their mothers murdered and mothers watching their kids’ souls leave their bodies—small bodies that were then wrapped in body bags.”

In 1992 by the Israel Defense Forces’ Home Front Command, established new civil defense regulations. The regulations required the inclusion of a residential protected room, a communal protected space, or an institutional protected space in every newly constructed building. “The rooms are meant to keep you safe from rockets.” However, a recent building inspection, showed about 75% of the safe rooms surveyed had one or more defects, and 70% of the shelters inspected had major construction flaws as well.

Many of the safe rooms that were breached in Israel during the 10/7 attacks had doors that could not be locked from the inside, they were also not even capable of stopping rounds from rifles or pistols from penetrating the inside of the safe room. There were many reports of residents trying to secure the doors with twine, vacuum cleaner hoses, wood, and bare hands. None of the safe rooms were resistant to fire. When terrorists did find a secured safe room they would simply start fires in the house to kill people in the safe rooms by burning them alive or force them out due to smoke and heat and then murdering them.

If a safe room is to be utilized in a home it must be able to withstand all threats that may be realistically imposed upon it. Further, it must be readily accessible, easily secured, and all aspects of its operation and capabilities known to all residents regardless of age.

#4 – Lack of Adequate Ammo Supplies

As outlined in #2 above, Israeli citizens had to apply for, qualify for, and receive a gun license before purchasing or a gun or ammunition. And even then, gun license holders can only have 50 rounds of ammunition on hand. Israel has gun laws that can only be described as ‘extremist’…and this directly led to hundreds of Israeli citizens being murdered, raped, and kidnapped. Since 10/7 Israel did relax that ammunition restriction…licensed gun owners can now have 100 rounds of pistol ammunition on hand.

Anyone who has ever been in a gun fight knows that you can blow through hundreds of rounds in a single, rather brief, battle. Even during training classes I have used 500 or more rounds in less than a day with measured and limited usage. In one class I ran almost 1000 rounds of AR ammo and another 300 rounds of pistol ammo. On one VIP protection detail I had 73 rounds on me, four 18-round mags and one in the chamber of my Sig. Even then I felt uncomfortable in case of need.

Without an adequate supply of appropriate ammunition your weapon(s) become completely useless. Not only should adequate ammunition supplies be available, an appropriate amount ammo should be pre-loaded in magazines and stored for easy/ready access.

What do I consider an adequate supply of ammunition? Here are my thoughts for minimums; 1) Pistol: 200 rounds of Hornady XTP, Golden Saber, or similar, 2) Shotgun: 300 rounds of 00 buckshot, Slugs, Hornady SST, 3) Carbine: 2000 rounds of a good penetrating round if 5.56, FMJ if 7.62. These are “per” weapon for immediate use. Pre-loaded minimum amounts in magazines, per-weapon; 1) pistols – 50-80 rounds, 2) carbines – 10 magazines. Magazines should be easily carried on your body in appropriate pouches.

Series Articles –

• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #1)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #2)
• Lesson Learned: 10/7 Attack on Israel (Part #3)

Related Articles –

• Grid-Down House Security : Strengthen your door…
• Shotgun Ammo Load-Out
• Choosing the Right Gun

 2009 - 2023 Copyright © AHTrimble.com ~ All rights reserved
No reproduction or other use of this content 
without expressed written permission from AHTrimble.com
See Content Use Policy for more information.